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			| Posted By Robert Treuber,
			Thursday, October 23, 2025 
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						To:     The executives and information 
security personnel at all entities regulated by the New York State 
Department of Financial Services (“DFS” or the “Department”) Re:   Guidance on Managing Risks Related to Third-Party Service Providers Date: October 21, 2025 Covered Entities[1] have become more reliant on Third-Party Service Providers[2] (“TPSP” or “TPSPs”) for services that involve access to Information Systems[3] or Nonpublic Information[4]
 (“NPI”).  Although there are many potential benefits to engaging TPSPs,
 Covered Entities must understand and address the risks posed by such 
reliance. For example, reliance on TPSPs introduces the risk of 
Cybersecurity Incidents[5]
 at the TPSP, which can have a significant impact on Covered Entities’ 
operations and NPI.  Appropriately managing these risks remains a 
crucial element of a Covered Entity’s cybersecurity program. Covered
 Entities’ exposure to threats will continue to grow as their reliance 
on technologies managed by TPSPs—such as cloud computing, file transfer 
systems, artificial intelligence (“AI”), and fintech 
solutions—increases.  The growing scale and complexity of cyber risks 
posed by TPSPs demands a proactive, risk-based, and continuously 
adaptive approach to third-party governance.  Senior Governing Bodies[6] and Senior Officers[7] must engage actively in cybersecurity risk management, including the oversight of TPSP-related risks.[8] 
 Unless a Covered Entity qualifies for an applicable exemption, Senior 
Governing Bodies must have a sufficient understanding of 
cybersecurity-related matters to exercise appropriate oversight, which 
includes the ability to provide a credible challenge to management’s 
cybersecurity-related decisions to ensure that those decisions align 
with the entity’s overall risk posture and resiliency objectives.[9] 
 The Cybersecurity Regulation (“Part 500”) also requires a Senior 
Officer or the Senior Governing Body to review and approve the Covered 
Entity’s cybersecurity policies and procedures at least annually.[10] The
 Department reviews Covered Entities’ information security policies and 
procedures, including those addressing TPSP risk, during examinations 
and investigations. In these reviews, DFS has identified areas where 
Covered Entities should strengthen their TPSP programs, including how 
they monitor, assess, and manage TPSP cybersecurity risk.  Specifically,
 DFS has identified the need for more robust due diligence, contractual 
provisions, monitoring and oversight, and TPSP risk management policies 
and procedures.  Moreover, DFS has observed a trend in which some 
Covered Entities outsource critical cybersecurity compliance obligations
 to TPSPs without ensuring appropriate oversight and verification by 
Senior Governing Bodies or Senior Officers.  As noted in previous 
guidance, Covered Entities may not delegate responsibility for 
compliance with the Cybersecurity Regulation to an affiliate or a TPSP.[11] 
 DFS has and will continue to consider the absence of appropriate TPSP 
risk management practices by Covered Entities in its examinations, 
investigations, and enforcement actions.[12] The
 Department is issuing this guidance on managing risks related to 
Third-Party Service Providers (“Guidance”) to assist Covered Entities of
 all sizes[13]
 in addressing risks associated with the use of TPSPs.  The Guidance 
does not impose new requirements or obligations on Covered Entities; 
rather, it is intended to clarify regulatory requirements, recommend 
industry best practices to mitigate common risks associated with TPSPs, 
and promote compliance with relevant sections of Part 500, including 
Section 500.11.[14] 
 In addition to clarifying regulatory requirements, the Guidance 
describes steps Covered Entities should consider taking to assess and 
address cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle of a TPSP 
relationship, beginning with the due diligence and selection processes, 
continuing through contracting, ongoing oversight and management of the 
relationship, and ending with the termination of the TPSP relationship. Identification, Due Diligence, and SelectionWhen
 selecting a TPSP, Covered Entities must assess the cybersecurity risks 
the TPSP poses to the Covered Entity’s Information Systems and NPI.  
Policies and procedures should outline how these risks are evaluated, 
including minimum cybersecurity standards required for engagement, and 
procedures for assessing the TPSP’s cybersecurity practices and controls
 based on the unique risks presented by the TPSP.[15] Covered
 Entities should classify TPSPs based on the latter’s risk profile, 
considering factors such as system access, data sensitivity, location, 
and how critical the service provided to the Covered Entity is to its 
operations. For example, a TPSP with privileged access[16]
 to a Covered Entity’s Information Systems and significant amounts of 
NPI presents a greater risk than a TPSP that provides services operating
 outside of the Covered Entity’s Information Systems.  Providers of 
critical services that often have a high degree of system-level access 
and the ability to access sensitive NPI include companies that provide 
IT managed services, outsourced help desk services, and insurance claims
 management services. Additionally, Covered Entities should 
develop a tailored, risk-based plan to mitigate risks posed by each 
TPSP.  The following is a non-exhaustive list of considerations that 
Covered Entities should assess when performing due diligence on TPSPs: The type and extent of access to Information Systems and NPI.The TPSP’s reputation within the industry, including its cybersecurity history and financial stability.Whether
 the TPSP has developed and implemented a strong cybersecurity program 
that addresses, at a minimum, the cybersecurity practices and controls 
required by the Covered Entity and Part 500.The access controls
 implemented by the TPSP for its own systems and data, as well as to 
access the Covered Entity’s Information Systems, and the proposed 
handling and storage of Covered Entity data, including whether 
appropriate controls, such as data segmentation and encryption, are 
applied based on the sensitivity of the data.[17]The criticality of the service(s) provided and the availability of alternative TPSPs.Whether
 the TPSP uses unique, traceable accounts for personnel accessing the 
Covered Entity’s systems and data and whether it maintains audit trails 
meeting the requirements of Section 500.6.Whether the TPSP, its
 affiliates, or vendors are located in, or operate from, a country or 
territory jurisdictions that is considered high-risk based on 
geopolitical, legal, socio-economic, operational, or other regulatory 
risks.Whether the TPSP maintains and regularly tests its incident response and business continuity plans.[18]The TPSP’s practices for selecting, monitoring, and contracting with downstream service providers (“fourth parties”).Whether the TPSP undergoes external audits or independent assessments (e.g.,
 ISO/IEC 27000 series, HITRUST) or can otherwise demonstrate, in 
writing, compliance with Part 500 or industry frameworks such as the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) Cybersecurity 
Framework.[19]
 Covered
 Entities should also consider how best to obtain, review, and validate 
information provided by prospective TPSPs.  For example, a standardized 
questionnaire may assist in gathering responses, but qualified personnel
 will need to interpret the responses to make risk-informed decisions, 
ask follow-up questions as necessary, and determine appropriate 
mitigation strategies. In some instances, Covered Entities may 
face constraints when selecting, contracting with, or transitioning away
 from a TPSP due to limited vendor options, industry concentration, or 
legacy system dependencies.  In such cases, organizations should make 
risk-informed decisions, document the relevant risks, take steps to 
implement compensating controls (e.g., monitoring, 
segmentation, contract triggers), and conduct regular assessments of the
 TPSP to evaluate whether viable alternative TPSPs have emerged over 
time. ContractingThe Cybersecurity Regulation requires 
Covered Entities that utilize TPSPs to develop and implement written 
policies and procedures that address due diligence and contractual 
protections.[20] 
 These policies must be risked-based and tailored to the services and 
sensitivity of the data and Information Systems that will be accessed by
 the TPSP.  Below are a few examples of baseline contract provisions 
Covered Entities should consider incorporating into their agreements[21] with TPSPs: Access
 Controls – Requirements for TPSPs to develop and implement policies and
 procedures addressing access controls, including multi-factor 
authentication, that comply with requirements in Sections 500.7 and 
500.12.[22]Data
 Encryption – Obligations to develop and implement policies and 
procedures addressing encryption in transit and at rest as required by 
Section 500.15.[23] 
 Although Covered Entities qualifying for exemptions under Section 
500.19 are not required to comply with this obligation, given the 
sensitivity of NPI, such Covered Entities should consider requiring 
TPSPs encrypt sensitive data, including NPI, in transit and at rest.Cybersecurity
 Event Notification – Provisions related to the immediate or timely 
notice to the Covered Entity upon the occurrence of a Cybersecurity 
Event directly impacting the Covered Entity’s Information Systems or NPI
 being held by the TPSP.[24]Compliance
 Representations – Obligations for the TPSP to provide representations 
and warranties regarding compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations, including applicable requirements of Part 500.[25]Data
 Location and Transfer Restrictions – Requirements for the TPSP to 
disclose where data may be stored, processed, or accessed; obtain prior 
written approval for cross-border transfers (or full prohibitions of 
this practice); and comply with applicable data residency or 
localization laws.  Although this contractual provision is not 
explicitly required by the Cybersecurity Regulation, the Department 
recommends incorporating this provision in contracts because Covered 
Entities can more effectively analyze the risk to sensitive data, 
including NPI, when they understand where data is stored and processed.Subcontractors
 – Requirements for the TPSP to disclose the use of subcontractors that 
may have access to or use the Covered Entity’s Information Systems or 
NPI, as well as the ability of the Covered Entity to reject the use of 
certain subcontractors for work on its Information Systems or NPI after 
conducting appropriate due diligence.  Although this practice is not 
required by the Cybersecurity Regulation, the Department recommends 
adoption of this practice so Covered Entities are better able to analyze
 the risk to sensitive data, including NPI.Data Use and Exit Obligations – Restrictions related to the use and sharing of data, obligations to delete[26]
 or migrate data held by the TPSP upon termination of the relationship, 
and obligations to obtain appropriate certifications confirming the 
completion of these steps.
 Where relevant, Covered Entities 
should consider including a clause related to the acceptable use of 
Artificial Intelligence (“AI”), and whether the Covered Entity’s data 
may be used to train AI models or be otherwise disclosed to additional 
parties.  In addition, the TPSP agreement should include remedies in the
 event the Covered Entity reasonably determines that the TPSP has 
breached any material terms of the agreement related to cybersecurity.  
These remedies may include requiring timely remediation or permitting 
early termination of the service agreement. This is not an 
exhaustive list of contractual provisions that Covered Entities should 
consider, nor is this list of terms viable or appropriate in all 
situations.[27] 
 Covered Entities should carefully evaluate terms based on the nature of
 the engagement, market conditions, and the sensitivity of data, among 
other factors. Ongoing Monitoring and OversightAs 
described above, each Covered Entity’s TPSP policy or policies must 
address, to the extent applicable, the periodic assessment of TPSPs 
based upon the risk each presents.[28] 
 The TPSP risk management procedures should include layered, 
risk-informed oversight processes and controls designed to confirm that 
TPSP cybersecurity programs are aligned with the Covered Entity’s 
cybersecurity expectations.[29] 
 Accordingly, Covered Entities should develop and implement policies and
 procedures for the ongoing monitoring and oversight of TPSPs.  The 
policies should be informed by a variety of factors, including the 
evolving threat and regulatory landscape, changes to products and 
services, and whether the TPSP has experienced a Cybersecurity Event.  
While many of the initial due diligence considerations remain relevant 
throughout the relationship, once active, Covered Entities must conduct 
periodic assessments based on the risk(s) a TPSP presents and the 
continued adequacy of their cybersecurity practices.[30]  These assessments may consider, among other things, security attestations (e.g.,
 SOC2, ISO 27001), penetration testing summaries, policy updates, 
evidence of security awareness training, and compliance audits. Moreover,
 where relevant, Covered Entities should request updates on 
vulnerability management, assess patching practices, and confirm 
remediation of previously identified deficiencies.  Material or 
unresolved risk should be documented in the Covered Entity’s risk 
assessment and escalated through appropriate internal risk governance 
channels.  As part of a broader resiliency strategy, Covered Entities 
should incorporate third-party risk into their incident response and 
business continuity planning.[31] 
 For example, Covered Entities should assess how they would rapidly 
transition to alternate systems or providers in the event of a 
disruption and consider testing relevant portions of their business 
continuity and incident response plans with their TPSPs. TerminationWhen
 preparing for the end of a TPSP relationship, Covered Entities must 
disable the TPSP’s access to the Covered Entity’s Information Systems.[32] 
 This includes revoking system access for TPSP personnel and 
subcontractors and deactivating service accounts.  For TPSPs providing 
cloud-based services, organizations should revoke identity federation 
tools (e.g., SSO, OAuth tokens), API integrations, and external
 storage access.  Covered Entities generally should require 
certification of destruction of NPI, secure return of data to the 
Covered Entity, or migration of data to another TPSP or internal 
environment.  As part of this process, Covered Entities should confirm 
that any remaining snapshots, backups, or cached datasets are deleted 
from TPSP systems and TPSP access to any shared resources is revoked. Additionally,
 Covered Entities should give special attention to residual or 
unmonitored access points that may fall outside routine access 
provisioning systems.  Access points that become redundant or 
unnecessary during the course of the TPSP relationship should be 
addressed or eliminated on an ongoing basis, rather than being left in 
place until the end of the relationship. Procedures should align with 
the Covered Entity’s cybersecurity program and comply with Section 
500.7. To ensure a secure and orderly termination, Covered 
Entities should develop a transition plan for critical services with 
clearly defined timelines, roles and responsibilities.  Management 
should engage key stakeholders, including IT, legal, compliance, 
procurement, and business units, to identify strategies to mitigate 
potential risks.  Prior to termination, Covered Entities should review 
the agreement with the TPSP to identify offboarding obligations and 
protections.  In addition, Covered Entities should verify and retain any
 data subject to legal, regulatory, or litigation hold requirements 
before initiating data return or destruction processes. After 
termination is completed, a final risk review should be conducted to 
confirm that all obligations have been fulfilled, and that access and 
data controls have been properly enforced.  The offboarding process 
should be documented and relevant audit logs retained to support 
accountability and future verification.  Finally, any lessons learned 
should be incorporated into future third-party risk assessments and 
contracting practices to refine and improve TPSP lifecycle management. ConclusionCovered
 Entities must evaluate and mitigate cybersecurity risks relevant to 
their own business.  To that end, this Guidance highlights risks 
associated with TPSPs as well as strategies to manage these risks as 
part of an effective cybersecurity program.  As third-party service 
offerings expand and evolve, so too will TPSP-related cybersecurity 
risks.  Managing these risks appropriately requires performing, at 
regular intervals, careful analysis of the sufficiency of 
administrative, technical, and physical controls to manage third-party 
risk, as required by Part 500. 
 
 [1]
 A Covered Entity is defined in § 500.1(e) as “any person operating 
under or required to operate under a license, registration, charter, 
certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization under the 
Banking Law, the Insurance Law or the Financial Services Law, regardless
 of whether the covered entity is also regulated by other government 
agencies.”  N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 23, § 500.1(e) (2025). 
References to Sections hereinafter refer to those in the Cybersecurity 
Regulation.  Capitalized terms used hereinafter are defined in the 
Cybersecurity Regulation.[2]
 Third-Party Service Provider is defined in § 500.1(s) as “a person 
that: (1) is not an affiliate of the covered entity; (2) is not a 
governmental entity; (3) provides services to the covered entity; and 
(4) maintains, processes or otherwise is permitted access to nonpublic 
information through its provision of services to the covered entity.”[3]
 An Information System is defined in § 500.1(i) as “a discrete set of 
electronic information resources organized for the collection, 
processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination or disposition of 
electronic information, as well as any specialized system such as 
industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching and private 
branch exchange systems, and environmental control systems.”[4]
 Nonpublic Information is defined in § 500.1(k) as ”all electronic 
information that is not publicly available information and is: (1) 
business related information of a covered entity the tampering with 
which, or unauthorized disclosure, access or use of which, would cause a
 material adverse impact to the business, operations or security of the 
covered entity; (2) any information concerning an individual which 
because of name, number, personal mark, or other identifier can be used 
to identify such individual, in combination with any one or more of the 
following data elements: (i) social security number; (ii) drivers’ 
license number or non-driver identification card number; (iii) account 
number, credit or debit card number; (iv) any security code, access code
 or password that would permit access to an individual’s financial 
account; or (v) biometric records; (3) any information or data, except 
age or gender, in any form or medium created by or derived from a health
 care provider or an individual and that relates to: (i) the past, 
present or future physical, mental or behavioral health or condition of 
any individual or a member of the individual's family; (ii) the 
provision of health care to any individual; or (iii) payment for the 
provision of health care to any individual.”[5]
 A Cybersecurity Incident is defined in § 500.1(g) as “a cybersecurity 
event that has occurred at the covered entity, its affiliates, or a 
third-party service provider that: (1) impacts the covered entity and 
requires the covered entity to notify any government body, 
self-regulatory agency or any other supervisory body; (2) has a 
reasonable likelihood of materially harming any material part of the 
normal operation(s) of the covered entity; or (3) results in the 
deployment of ransomware within a material part of the covered entity’s 
information systems.”  A Cybersecurity Event is defined in § 500.1(f) as
 “any act or attempt, successful or unsuccessful, to gain unauthorized 
access to, disrupt or misuse an information system or information stored
 on such information system.”[6]
 A Senior Governing Body is defined in § 500.1(q) as “the board of 
directors (or an appropriate committee thereof) or equivalent governing 
body or, if neither of those exist, the senior officer or officers of a 
covered entity responsible for the covered entity’s cybersecurity 
program. For any cybersecurity program or part of a cybersecurity 
program adopted from an affiliate under section 500.2(d) of this Part, 
the senior governing body may be that of the affiliate.”[7]
 A Senior Officer(s) is defined in § 500.1(r) as “the senior individual 
or individuals (acting collectively or as a committee) responsible for 
the management, operations, security, information systems, compliance 
and/or risk of a covered entity, including a branch or agency of a 
foreign banking organization subject to this Part.”[8]
 Tit. 23, § 500.4(d).  While Covered Entities that qualify for 
exemptions under § 500.19 do not need to comply with the requirements of
 § 500.4, Covered Entities must still maintain a written cybersecurity 
policy or policies that are approved at least annually by a Senior 
Officer(s) or the Senior Governing Body who oversee its implementation. 
Tit. 23, § 500.3.[9]  See, e.g., Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Information Technology Examination Handbook, Management Booklet, at I.A.1 Board of Directors Oversight, n.3,
 
https://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets/management/i-governance/ia-it-governance/ia1-board-of-directors-oversight/
 which states that “[a] credible challenge involves being actively 
engaged, asking thoughtful questions, and exercising independent 
judgment.”[11] See
 N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Industry Letter on Adoption of an 
Affiliate’s Cybersecurity Program (Oct. 22, 2021), available at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/industry_letters/il20211022_affiliates_cybersecurity_program;
 see also, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp., Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interagency Guidance on 
Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management, 88 Fed. Reg. 37920 (June 9, 
2023); see also id. tit. 23, § 500.4(a)(1).[13] Note
 that the Cybersecurity Regulation imposes different requirements on 
organizations based on their size and resources. See id. § 500.1(d) 
(describing the qualifying conditions for Class A Companies) and § 
500.19(a) (describing the qualifying factors for Covered Entities that 
are granted limited exemptions based upon the number of Covered Entity 
personnel, revenue, and assets).[14] For
 larger Covered Entities, including Class A Companies, a risk-based 
approach and solutions may require different steps based upon the unique
 circumstances, technologies, and other factors relevant to the entity.[15] Tit. 23, § 500.11(a).[16]
 Privileged access refers to the access an Information System user has 
where the user “is authorized (and therefore, trusted) to perform 
security-relevant functions that ordinary users are not authorized to 
perform.”  See, definition of a “privileged user,” National Institute of
 Standards and Technology, SP 800-53r5, Appendix A: Glossary, Security 
and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations (Sep. 
2020, updated Dec. 10, 2020), available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final.[17] Tit. 23, §§ 500.11(b)(1)-(2).[18] Tit. 23, § 500.16(d).[20] Tit. 23, § 500.11(b).[21]
 The type of agreement, provisions, and exhibits will vary depending on 
the nature of the services provided and type and breadth of data the 
TPSP will access.  For example, when using cloud-based service providers
 such as Software-as-a-Service and Infrastructure-as-a-Service, among 
others, Covered Entities may want to append a service-level agreement, 
which typically defines service quality expectations, system 
availability of the product or service for use (commonly referred to as 
“up-time”), and response and recovery times.  Alternatively, 
organizations providing professional services (e.g., developer, 
consultant, auditor) generally append Statements of Work to address 
project-specific obligations, such as deliverables, timelines, and 
scope.  Both documents serve as contractual supplements that clarify 
roles and expectations under a broader agreement.  DFS understands that 
these types of service-level agreements are often drafted by the TPSP, 
and that Covered Entities may not always have sufficient leverage to 
negotiate many of the terms.[22] Tit. 23, § 500.11(b)(1).[23] Tit. 23, § 500.11(b)(2).[24]
 Section500.11 requires a Covered Entity’s policies and procedures to 
include relevant guidelines covering, among other things, contractual 
provisions addressing a TPSP’s obligation to provide notice of 
Cybersecurity Events.  A Covered Entity’s policies and procedures must 
include guidelines and/or contractual protections that address the 
notice to be provided in the event of a Cybersecurity Event directly 
impacting the Covered Entity’s Information Systems or the Covered 
Entity’s NPI being held by the TPSP. See supra note 5 (observing that 
Cybersecurity Events include more than Cybersecurity Incidents).[25] Tit. 23, § 500.11(b)(4).[26]
 See, e.g., tit. 23, § 500.13(b) (requiring each Covered Entity to have 
policies and procedures for the secure disposal on a periodic basis of 
certain NPI no longer necessary for business operations or other 
legitimate business purposes).[27]
 In this circumstance, Covered Entities should still seek to secure 
reasonable protections, such as breach notification clauses, data use, 
and assurances regarding access controls and data handling.  
Additionally, they should consider limiting the volume and sensitivity 
of data shared, using tokenization to replace sensitive data elements 
and applying pseudonymization techniques to obscure individual 
identities, where appropriate.  Independent third-party assessments or 
certifications (e.g., SOC 2, ISO 27001) should also be reviewed and 
required where feasible.  In parallel, organizations should develop 
medium- to long-term strategies
 to reduce dependency, such as enabling data portability, modularizing 
services, or evaluating alternative providers.  Moreover, high-risk TPSP
 relationships should be appropriately escalated through risk governance
 frameworks and reflected in the Covered Entity’s risk assessments and 
board-level reporting.[28] See tit. 23, § 500.11(a)(4).[29]
 See, e.g., FINRA, Regulatory Notice 21–29, FINRA Reminds Firms of Their
 Supervisory Obligations Related to Outsourcing to Third-Party 
Vendors (Aug. 13, 2021), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/21-29
 (Guidance noting that member firms should consider, among other things,
 vendor self-assessments, including certified reporting, as well as 
conducting onsite visits) and NIST SP 800-161r1-upd1, Cybersecurity 
Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations 
(May 5, 2022, rev. Nov. 1, 2024), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-161r1-upd1.pdf
 (Publication recommending that organizations audit Information and 
Communication Technology “supply chain-relevant events within their 
information system boundaries” using mechanisms such as system logs, 
intrusion detection system logs, firewall reports, and other evidence 
trails.[30] Tit. 23, § 500.11(a)(4).[31] See, e.g., tit. 23, § 500.16.[32] Tit. 23, § 500.7(a)(4). 
				Tags: 
						cybersecurity 
						
						DFS 
						
						Industry Letter 
						   |  
			|     |  
			| Posted By Robert Treuber,
			Monday, October 20, 2025 
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						These bills have impact on the Town of Chester, Co-ops, electronic records, corporate fines and tax exemptions in Nassau County.   | A3028 | Dilan CO: O'PharrowAllows domestic insurers to make certain records available by electronic means
 Same as S 4674-A JACKSON
 SUMM :Amd S325, Ins L Allows domestic insurers to make certain records available by electronic means if they are easily accessible from the insurer's principal office in this state and the insurer complies with all applicable state and federal laws and regulations.
 Eff. Date 10/16/2025
 | 
   | A8651A | Simone CO: RosenthalRelates to the tax exemption of a mutual redevelopment company
 Same as S 7780-B HOYLMAN-SIGAL
 SUMM :Amd S125, Priv Hous Fin L Relates to the extension of a tax exemption for a mutual redevelopment company in a city having a population of one million or more persons.
 Eff. Date 10/14/2025
 | 
   | S277A | SKOUFISRelates to community preservation funds for the town of Chester
 Same as A 2022-A Maher
 SUMM :Add S64-l, Town L; add Art 31-A-4 SS1439-aaa - 1439-ppp, Tax L Authorizes the town of Chester to establish community preservation funds; establishes a real estate transfer tax with revenues therefrom to be deposited in said community preservation fund.
 Eff. Date 10/16/2025
 | 
   | S2551 | MYRIE CO: HOYLMAN-SIGAL, WEBBIncreases the fines imposed on a corporation for an offense defined within the penal law
 Same as A 3858 Rozic
 SUMM :Amd S80.10, Pen L Increases the fines imposed on a corporation for an offense defined within the penal law.
 Criminal Sanction Impact.
 | 
   | S6818 | BYNOEAuthorizes the county of Nassau assessor to accept an application for a real property tax exemption from The Cathedral of the Incarnation in the Diocese of Long Island
 Same as A 2595 Ra
 SUMM :Authorizes the county of Nassau assessor to accept an application for a real property tax exemption from The Cathedral of the Incarnation in the Diocese of Long Island.
 Eff. Date 10/16/2025
 | 
   | S6819A | BYNOEAuthorizes the county of Nassau assessor to accept an application for a real property tax exemption from Chabad of West Hempstead
 Same as A 6614-A Ra
 SUMM :Authorizes the county of Nassau assessor to accept an application for a real property tax exemption from Chabad of West Hempstead for a portion of the 2022-2023 school taxes, a portion of the 2023 general taxes; all of the 2023-2024 school taxes and all of the 2024 general taxes; and all of the restored 2024-2025 school taxes and all of the restored 2025 general taxes.
 Eff. Date 10/16/2025
 | 
         
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			| Posted By Robert Treuber,
			Friday, October 17, 2025 
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						The following bills were signed and chaptered. A3470Lavine CO: Seawright
 Relates to notice to be provided prior to a foreclosure action by a homeowners' association
 Same as S 7413 KAVANAGH
 Requires notice to be provided ninety days prior to commencement of a foreclosure action by a homeowners' association or condominium board to enforce a lien for unpaid common charges, assessments, fines or fees.
 Eff. Date 10/16/2025
   A6770Griffin
 Relates to the applicability of the residential redevelopment inhibited property exemption
 Same as S 7285 RYAN S
 Relates to expanding the applicability of the residential redevelopment inhibited property exemption to all cities, town, or villages in the state.
 Eff. Date 11/15/2025
   A6869Alvarez
 Prohibits discriminatory practices by real estate appraisers and furthers fair housing compliance
 Same as S 7320 KAVANAGH
 Prohibits discriminatory practices by real estate appraisers; furthers fair housing compliance.
 Eff. Date 10/16/2025
 
				Tags: 
						Chaptered bills 
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			| Posted By Robert Treuber,
			Wednesday, October 15, 2025 
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						Governor Hochul has signed A8651-a/S7780-b. TITLE OF BILL:
 
An act to amend the private housing finance law, in relation to the
amount of taxes paid by a cooperative
 
 
PURPOSE OF BILL:
 
This bill would authorize Article V mutual redevelopment companies in
cities with a population of over one million people to pay no more than
five percent tax on their shelter rent
 
 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:
 
Section 1 of the bill amends section 125 of the private housing finance
law to ensure that.the shelter tax minimum rate for article five co-ops
is no greater than five percent
Section 2 is the effective date
 
 
JUSTIFICATION:
 
This bill would provide relief to Penn South, the only remaining Article
V co-op property. Penn South faces rising operational costs, which
threaten to impact building quality and financial health. There is an
acute shortage of affordable housing and this legislation would ensure
the viability of what already exists.
 
Additionally, this bill would ensure that Penn South receives equal tax
treatment compared to Article II Mitchell Lama developments.  These
properties were previously treated similarly and this bill would restore
that equal treatment.
     
				Tags: 
						Chaptered bills 
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			| Posted By Technology Committee,
			Monday, October 6, 2025 
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						Dear Colleagues, On October 14, 2025, Microsoft will officially end all support for Windows 10. After this date, Windows 10 machines will no longer receive security updates or patches, leaving them dangerously exposed to hackers and other cyber threats. This change is not optional and it will impact many of us directly. While some computers can be upgraded to Windows 11, a large number of office machines will not meet the requirements. That means many devices will need to be replaced entirely to remain secure and compliant. Continuing to operate on unsupported systems is a serious risk,  both to your own data and to your clients’ information. The title industry is a prime target for cyberattacks, and leaving Windows 10 machines in service after October 14 invites unnecessary vulnerability. Please take time now to: Identify all computers in your office still running Windows 10.Confirm whether they can be upgraded to Windows 11.Make replacement plans immediately for any systems that cannot.
 This is a significant change with a firm deadline. Acting today will help ensure your business operations remain secure and uninterrupted. Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter.   Best regards, Andrew Zankel, NTP - Technology Committee Chair Dan Celikoyar – Technology Committee Vice-Chair 
 
				Tags: 
						cybersecurity 
						
						Technology Committee 
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			| Posted By Robert Treuber,
			Tuesday, September 9, 2025 
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						Julie Sweet,
 CEO of consulting giant Accenture, has a rare line of sight into the AI
 ambitions and worries of the world's biggest companies. https://www.axios.com/2025/09/09/behind-the-curtain-slow-hard-ai?stream=top   "...companies need more than 
AI-proficient staff. They need leaders, often different from the ones 
existing today, who can figure out how to pull AI levers across the 
company to truly move the needle meaningfully...."     
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			| Posted By Robert Treuber,
			Monday, August 25, 2025 
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						| A5364 | Carroll PLimiting the shift between classes of taxable property in the town of Haverstraw, county of Rockland
 Same as S 5233 WEBER
 SUMM :Amd S1903, RPT L Relates to limiting the shift between classes of taxable property in the town of Haverstraw, county of Rockland for 2025-2026.
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				Tags: 
						Chaptered bills 
						
						Rockland County 
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			| Posted By Robert Treuber,
			Monday, August 11, 2025 
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						Bill No.
 A5380    Bronson
 Extends the authorization for the county of Monroe to impose certain sales and compensating use taxes
 Same as S 6669 COONEY
 SUMM : Amd S1210, Tax L Extends the authorization for the county of Monroe to impose certain sales and compensating use taxes to November 30, 2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 A6531    Miller
 Extends authorization of the county of Herkimer to impose a county recording tax on obligation secured by a mortgage on real property
 Same as S 5607 WALCZYK
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 549 of 2005 Extends authorization of the county of Herkimer to impose a county recording tax on obligation secured by a mortgage on real property to 12/01/2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 A8210    Kelles CO: Gallahan
 Extends provisions of law authorizing the county of Cortland to impose an additional mortgage recording tax
 Same as S 7912 WEBB
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 443 of 2007 Extends provisions of law authorizing the county of Cortland to impose an additional mortgage recording tax until December 1, 2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 S21    STEC
 Relates to expenditures for Warren county community colleges; extends the effectiveness of provisions relating to an additional Warren county mortgage recording tax
 Same as A 3980 Simpson
 SUMM : Amd S261, Tax L; amd S2, Chap 368 of 2008 Relates to Warren county no longer providing community colleges funding with excess funds from the collection of mortgage recording taxes as such money is allocated to the CDTA; extends the effectiveness of provisions relating to an additional Warren county mortgage recording tax to December 1, 2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 
 S1078A    HELMING
 Extends provisions of law authorizing the county of Livingston to impose an additional mortgage recording tax
 Same as A 2728-A Bailey
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 373 of 2019 Extends provisions of law authorizing the county of Livingston to impose an additional mortgage recording tax until December 1, 2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 S2111    OBERACKER
 Relates to the authority for the impose an additional mortgage recording tax in Otsego county
 Same as A 5479 Tague
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 374 of 2024 Extends the authority for the county of Otsego to impose an additional mortgage recording tax.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 S3495    O'MARA
 Extends provisions relating to the mortgage tax in the county of Steuben
 Same as A 6659 Palmesano
 SUMM : Amd S3, Chap 365 of 2005 Extends provisions relating to the mortgage tax in the county of Steuben until December 1, 2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 S3497    O'MARA
 Extends provisions relating to the mortgage tax in the county of Yates
 Same as A 4069 Palmesano
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 366 of 2005 Extends provisions relating to the mortgage tax in the county of Yates until December 1, 2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 S3626    OBERACKER
 Extends the authorization for the county of Schoharie to impose a county recording tax on obligation secured by a mortgage on real property
 Same as A 4135 Tague
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 333 of 2006 Extends the authorization for the county of Schoharie to impose a county recording tax on obligation secured by a mortgage on real property.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 S4543    OBERACKER
 Extends the mortgage recording tax for Chenango county and relates to the depositing of mortgage recording tax funds into the general fund of the county of Chenango
 Same as A 5351 Angelino
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 376 of 2024; amd S261, Tax L Extends the mortgage recording tax for Chenango county; relates to the depositing of mortgage recording tax funds into the general fund of the county of Chenango.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 
 S6212    HINCHEY
 Extends the authorization of the county of Greene to impose an additional mortgage recording tax
 Same as A 5007 Tague
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 218 of 2009 Extends the authorization of the county of Greene to impose an additional mortgage recording tax.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 S6216    WALCZYK
 Extends provisions allowing the county of Fulton to impose a mortgage recording tax
 Same as A 7443 Smullen
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 489 of 2004 Extends provisions allowing the county of Fulton to impose a county recording tax on obligation secured by a mortgage on real property to November 30, 2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 
 S6740    BORRELLO
 Extends the authorization of the county of Cattaraugus to impose an additional mortgage recording tax
 Same as A 7420 Sempolinski
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 98 of 2009 Extends the authorization of the county of Cattaraugus to impose an additional mortgage recording tax until December 1, 2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 S7080    HINCHEY
 Extends the authority of the county of Columbia to impose an additional real estate transfer tax
 Same as A 7665 Bendett
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 556 of 2007 Extends the authority of the county of Columbia to impose an additional real estate transfer tax by two years.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 S7128    WALCZYK
 Extends certain provisions authorizing the county of Hamilton to impose a county recording tax on obligations secured by mortgages on real property
 Same as A 7713 Smullen
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 326 of 2006 Extends certain provisions authorizing the county of Hamilton to impose a county recording tax on obligations secured by mortgages on real property to December 1, 2027.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 S7525A    FAHY
 Extends the authorization to impose a county recording tax on obligations secured by a mortgage on real property in Albany County
 Same as A 8114-A Steck
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 405 of 2005 Extends the authorization to impose a county recording tax on obligations secured by a mortgage on real property in Albany County.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 
 S8180    SEPULVEDA
 Extends authorization for the city of New York to sell certain property owned by such city
 Same as A 8426 Cook
 SUMM : Amd S2, Chap 548 of 2010 Extends the authorization for the city of New York to sell to abutting property owners real property owned by such city, consisting of tax lots that cannot be independently developed due to the size, shape, configuration and topography of such lots and the zoning regulations applicable thereto.
 Eff. Date 08/07/2025
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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			| Posted By Robert Treuber,
			Tuesday, August 5, 2025 
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						 A bill was signed and chaptered to amend chapter 218 of the laws of 2009  amending the tax law relating  to  authorizing the county of Greene to impose an additional mortgage recording tax, in relation to extending  the  effectiveness thereof.
					 
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			| Posted By Robert Treuber,
			Wednesday, July 30, 2025 
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						A bill that extends limitations on the shift between classes of taxable property in 
the town of Clarkstown, county of Rockland for an additional year was signed by Governor Hochul.  This bill would limit shifts between homestead and non-homestead property classes of no more than one percent per year Section one of the bill amends section 1903 of the real property tax law as it relates to limiting the shift between classes of taxable property to one percent in the Town of Clarkstown.
 Section two of the bill relates to the effective date. JUSTIFICATION:
 Municipalities that have classes of taxable property(homestead/nonhomestead) are often faced with drastic fluctu-
 ations in shifts between the two classes of taxable property.  Current law limits those shifts at 5% but this bill would restrict the shift in the Town of Clarkstown to no more than 1%; creating stability in the tax base from year to year. Similar legislation was proposed and implemented last year, this act will extend the limitation on the shift between
 classes of taxable property to one percent in the Town of Clarkstown for another year.
 Click here for the bill text.   
				Tags: 
						Rockland County 
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